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ANNOUNCEMENT
For many years there has been felt the need of a law journal to be conducted under the auspices of the Department of Law of the University of
Michigan. Various causes, however, have conspired to postpone the undertaking until the present time. Plans have been now matured for the establishment of such a magazine, and with this issue the MICHIGAN LAW R vZw
enters upon a career which it is hoped may prove to be one of usefulness
and success. The purpose is to give expression to the legal scholarship of
the University, and to serve the profession and the public by timely discussion
of legal problems, and by calling attention to the most important developments in the field of jurisprudence.
There are, of course, several excellent legal-journals already in the field,
but no one of them serves quite the purpose which is the aim of this one.
There is, moreover, in the great northwest, a field essentially unoccupied,
while in the alumni of this department, now numbering considerably over six
thousand members, there exists a loyal and influential constituency to whom,
it is hoped, such a journal will prove especially attractive.
The magazine will be made up of four chief departments: first, leading
articles upon important and interesting legal subjects; second, notes and comment upon current topics and significant occurrences in the legal world;
third, abstracts and digests of the most important recent cases; andfourth,
reviews of books and comments on legal literature.
In the first department, it is the hope to give such discussions of the
legal problems of the day as will prove useful, reliable and scholarly.
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In the second, may be expected interesting and profitable notes and comments upon legal events. In the third, an especial effort will be made not to
refer to every case, but to give such critical and helpful analysis of the most
important recent cases as will serve to show their real effect upon the development of the law. In the department of book reviews, it will be the aim to
give honest, impartial and competent estimates of the newest books, and
helpful reviews of the current legal literature. All articles and book reviews
will appear over the signatures of the writers.
It will be the aim to make the journal practical without usurping the
functions of the text-book or the digest, and scholarly without becoming so
academic in its character as to be out of touch with the needs and aims of the
lawyer of today. It will not be local in its character or be confined to the
discussion of law-school problems.
The magazine will be under the editorial management of a member of the
faculty, assisted by an Advisory Board, but all of the other members of the
Articles from members of other
faculty will co-operate in conducting it.
of legal interest may also be
subjects
upon
University
faculties in the
expected, and contributions from outside sources will frequently appear.
The magazine will contain about eighty pages in each issue, and will
regularly appear on the first of each month in the college year, exclusive of
October.
This enterprise is in no sense undertaken for the pecuniary benefit of
its projectors, or any of them. All profits, if any, which may accrue, will be
devoted to the improvement of the magazine, and to the promotion of the
welfare of the Law Department.
Founded in this spirit, the projectors make bold to appeal for support to
the alumni and friends of this Law School, and to the members of the legal
profession in general.

NOTE AND COMMENT
THE RIGHT OF A DE JURE OV.FIC-R TO REcOVER SALARY OR EES PAID
TO A DR FACTO OFPCR.-The question of the right of a dejure officer, who
has established his title to the office, to recover from the municipality, or
from the de facto officer, the amount of salary or fees paid by the municipality to the de facto officer, was involved in the recent interesting case of
Coughlin v. McElroy, et al., 50 AtI. Rep. 1025, decided January 9, 1902,
by the Supreme Court of Connecticut. It appeared that Coughlin and
Mcl lroy were rival candidates for the office of tax collector of the City of
Bridgeport. As a result of the election, MAIc]lroy was regularly declared
elected, and in good faith qualified and entered upon the performance of the
duties of the office. Coughlin contested the election and was finally held to
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be entitled to the office. (Coughlin v. McElroy, 72 Conn. 99, 43 Atl. Rep.
854, 77 Am. St. Rep. 301.) While Mc]lroy was performing the duties of the
office, he was, in pursuance of an established custom, permitted by the city
authorities to retain, out of the funds collected by him, the compensation of
the office. Coughlin having established his title to the office, brought this
action against the city and McElroy to recover the amounts so retained by
McElroy, with the assent of the city, as his compensation. The court held
that the retention of the compensation by McElroy with the assent of the
city, under the circumstances named, must be regarded as a payment of the
same by the city to McElroy, in good faith, and before he was ousted. Proceeding from this point, the court said: "This being so, the question is
whether the city, having in good faith paid to the de facto officer, before
judgment of ouster, the fees of the office, is liable to the de jure officer for
such fees. Upon this question the decisions of the courts of this country are
in direct conflict. Quite a number of courts of high authority, among which
may be mentioned those of California, Maine, Tennessee, Wyoming, and
Pennsylvania, hold that such a payment does not protect the community
against the claims of the de jure officer. Peopile v. Smith, 28 Cal. 21;
Andrews v. Portland, 79 le. 484, 10 Atl. 458, 10 Am. St. Rep. 280; layor,
etc., v. Woodward, 12 Heisk. 499, 27 Am. Rep. 750; Rasmussen v. Board
(Wyo.) 56 Pac. 1098, 45L. R. A. 295; Philadelphiav. Rink (Pa.), 2 Atl. 505.
On the other hand, the courts of a majority of the states that have had occasion to pass upon this question hold that such a payment does protect the
community. Among the courts holding this doctrine may be mentioned those
of the states of Michigan, New York, Missouri, Ohio, Kansas, Nebraska, and
New Hampshire. Board v. Benoit, 20 Mich. 176, 4 Am. Rep. 382; Dolan v.
Mayor, etc., 68 N. Y. 274, 23 Am. Rep. 168; AftcVeany v. Mfayor, etc., 80 N.
Y. 185, 36 Am. Rep. 600; State v. Clark, 52 Mo. 508; Westbergv. City o
Kansas City, 64 Mo.493; Steubenville v. Culp, 38 Ohio St. 23, 43 Am. Rep.
417; Commissioners v. Anderson, 20 Kan. 298, 27 Ant. Rep. 171; State
v. MBilne (Neb.), 54 N. W. 521, 19 L. R. A. 689, 38 Am. St. Rep. 724; Shannan
v. Portsmouth, 54 N. H. 183. It seems to us that the rule laid down in this last
class of cases is, in reason, the better rule. It rests upon the familiar and
reasonable rule that persons having the right to do business with a de facto
officer, like the one in question, have the right to regard him as a valid
officer, and the right to make payments to him without the risk of having to
pay a second time. This is the rule that protected the taxpayers in making
payments to McElroy, and there appears to be no good reason why it should
not be applied to payments made by the city to him in good faith, and before
judgment of ouster.
Our conclusion is that the city is not liable to the
plaintiff for the fees paid by it to the defacto collector. * * * *
"The next question is whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the
de facto officer the fees paid to such officer by the city; and the answer to this
depends upon the answer to the further question whether this can be done at
common law, and without the aid'of a statute. The courts of this country
that have had occasion to pass upon this last question have almost unanimously answered it in the affirmative. That, in cases like the present, the
legal right to the office carries with it the right to the salary and emoluments
thereof; that the salary follows the office; and that the defacto officer, though
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he performs the duties of the office, has no legal right to the emoluments
thereof-are propositions so generally held by the courts as to make the
citation of authorities in support of them almost superfluous. Nearly all, if
not all, cases hereinbefore cited upon both views as to the liability of the city,
hold that the de facto officer, for fees and emoluments of the office received
by him, is liable at common law to the officer de fure. So far as we are aware,
the only well-considered case taking a contrary view of the law is that of
Stuhr v. Curran, 44 N. J. Law, 186, 43 Am. Rep. 353; and that was decided
by a divided court, standing seven to five. We think the able dissenting
opinion of Chief Justice Beasley in that case shows conclusively that at common law, in a case like the present, the de jure officer is entitled to recover
from the de facto officer. Another well-considered case directly in point in
favor of this view is that of Kreilz v. Behrensmeyer, 149 Ill. 496, 36 N. E.
Rep. 983, 24 L. R. A. 59."
The decision of the court is undoubtedly in accordance with the weight
of authority. (See M cHmm on PuBuIc OVVICERS, 332.) To the list of
states holding that the municipality can not be compelled to pay to the dejure
officer after payment in good faith to the de facto officer, may be added:, 18 Pac. Rep. 273), South Dakota,
Ariz.
Arizona (Shaw v. Pima CGounty,
(Fuller v. Roberts Co., 9 S. Dak. 216, 68 N. W. Rep. 308. See also, Selby
v. Portland, 14 Oreg. 243. 58 Am. Rep. 307.

NO=IALExumPLARv DAMAGES WHERE ACTUAL DAMAGES mxEiL
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, for the second circuit, in the
case of Press Pub. Co. v. kfonroe, 19 C. C. A. 429, 38 U. S. App. 410, 73
Fed. Rep. 196, 51 L. R. A. 353, has added the weight of its authority to the
list of those which hold that exemplary damages may be awarded, in a
proper case, even though the actual damages which can be shown are
merely nominal. The opposite view, commonly attributed to the case of
Stacy v. Portland Pub. Co., 68 Me. 279, proceeds upon the theory that
exemplary damages are awarded not only to compensate the individual but
also for the protection of the public interests, and asserts that "if the
individual hasbutanominal interest, society can have none. . . If there was
enough in the defense to mitigate th*e damages to the individual, so did it
mitigate the damages to the public as well." The same view has been
announced in Kuhn v. Railway Co. 74 Iowa, 137, 37 N. W. Rep. 116;
Maxwell v. Kennedy, 50 Wis. 645, 7 N. W. Rep. 657; and Schippel v.
Norton, 38 Kan. 567, 16. Ptc. Rep. 804. These cases, however (andthere are
others to the same effect, e. g.: Gilmore v. Mathews. 67 Me. 517; Freese
v. Tripb, 70 Ill. 496; Ofeidel v. Anthis, 71 Ill. 241; Ganssly v. Perkins, 30
Mich. 492), are said by the Court of Appeals, to be "plainly at variance with
the theory upon which exemplary damages are awarded in the Federal
courts, namely, as something additional to, and in no wise dependent upon,
the actual pecuniary loss to the plaintiff, being frequently given in actions
where the wrong done to the plaintiff is incapable of being measured by a
money standard. Day v. W/oodwortk, 54 U. S. (13 How.) 370, 14 L. ed.
184. *There is room for argument against the allowance of exemplary
damages at all as anomalous and illogical. Some courts have held that it is
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unfair to allow the plaintiff to recover, not only all the loss he has actually
sustained, but also the fine which society imposes on the offender to protect
its peculiar interests. But if it be once conceded that such damages may be
assessed against the wrongdoer, and, when assessed, may be taken by the
plaintiff-and such is the settled law of the Federal courts-there is neither
sense nor reason in the proposition that such additional damages may be
recovered by a plaintiff who is able to show that he has lost $10, and may not
be recovered by some other plaintiff who has sustained, it may be, far
greater injury, bat is unable to prove that he is poorer in pocket by the
wrongdoing of defendant."
Wilson v. Vaughn, 23 Fed. Rep. 229, adopts
the same theory, as does also the supreme court of Alabama, in Railroad Co.
v. Sellers, 93 Ala. 9, 9 Southern Rep. 375. The cases cited as taking the
opposite view may have been rightly decided upon their special facts-and
doubtless most lawyers would agree to the conclusions in the majority of
them-but if exemplary damages are to be awarded at all, the cases wherein
an injury, not capable of pecuniary estimation, is committed under circumstances of gross insult, indignity, contumely or malice, seem to be the very
ones in which their allowance is most wholesome and effective. It is,
moreover, doubtful whether a careful analysis of the cases will not demonstrate that the supposed conflict is more verbal than substantial, and whether
there has not been a failure to distinguish between no injury at all, or an
injury merely nominal, and a real and substantial injury incapable of being
expressed in terms of dollars and cents. In this connection a comparison of
Maxwell v. Kennedy, 50 Wis. 645, sufira, and the later case of Hacker v.
Heiney, 111 Wis. 313, 319; or of Hefley v. Baker, 19 Kan. 9, and SchipiPel v.
Norton, 38 Kans. 567, supra, will prove suggestive.

SIDUCTION - FICTION
Or
SBRVic-The -doctrine that, to recover
damages for the seduction of his daughter, a parent must offer some evidence
of a loss of service, received a striking illustration in a case recently decided
by the english Court of Appeal. The plaintiff's daughter, who was -in the
service of .the defendant, was permitted to go out once a week for an
afternoon and evening. On such occasions she went to her father's house
and assisted in household duties. In an action by the plaintiff for the
seduction of his daughter by the defendant while she was in the latter's
service, Held, that there was no evidence of the relation of master and
servant between the plaintiff and his daughter to support the action,
Whilbourne v. Williams. [1901] 2 K. B. 722.
It was urged that as the action of seduction is founded on a fiction, there
is no need to have any support for it in fact, but the Court of Appeal refused
to yield to this argument, saying that for the fiction there must be some
foundation, however slender, in fact.
On the other hand, in the recent case of Anthony v. Norton, (1899) 60
Kan. 341, 56 Pac. Rep. 529, 72 Am. St. Rep. 360, 44 L. R. A. 757, the
supreme court of Kansas went to the other extreme. In the official headnote
by Doster, Ch. J., who wrote the opinion, it is said: "The common-law rule in
actions by a parent for damages for the seduction of his daughter, which required
him to sue, in the capacity of a master, for the loss of her services as a servant,
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although in fact permitting a recovery
the rule of a legal fiction which no
procedure, because of the abolition by
its requirement to state the actual facts

by him in his parental relation, was
longer obtains under the reformed
the Code of fictions in pleading, and
in controversy."

NEGLIGENCE-DRUGGIST SELLING PROPRIETARY MEDICINE WITHOUT
KNOwiIxG CONTENTS-Plaintiff's daughter was suffering from a headache,
and went to the store of defendant, a druggist, and asked for and obtained a
"Kohler Headache Powder."
Returning home, she took the powder, and
died from its effects. The action was for the recovery of damages, the
plaintiff's contention being that "the vender of drugs is bound to know what
he is selling, to such an extent at least, as to insure that he is not selling the
ignorant public a deadly poison disguised as a useful medicine." Held,
that there could be no recovery. West v. Emanuel, (1901) 198 Pa. 180, 47
Atl. Rep. 965, 53 L. R. A. 329.
It appeared that Kohler's headache powders were a well known preparation, generally kept on sale by druggists, and recognized and regarded as an
efficient and proper remedy for headaches. They were prepared by Kohler
and sold by him to the druggists. "In the sales of patent or proprietary
medicines furnished by the compounder of the ingredients which compose
them," said the court, "the druggist is not required to analyze the contents
of each bottle or package he receives. If he delivers to the consumer the
article called for, with the label of the proprietary or patentee upon it, he
cannot be justly charged with negligence in so doing."
The liability of the druggist who in person or by his clerk negligently
sells a dangerous drug for a harmless one, is abundantly established by the
authorities, [Brown v. Marshall, (1882) 47 Mich. 576, 41 Am. Rep. 728;
Thomas v. Winchester, (1852) 6 N. Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455; Fleet v.
Hollenkemp, (1852) 13 B. Mon. 219, 56 Am. Dec. 563; Wise v. Morgan,(1898)
101 Tenn. 273, 48 S. W. Rep. 971, 44 L. R. A. 548; McCubbin v. Hastingg,
(1875) 27 La. Ann. 713; Norton v. Sewall, (1870) 106 Mass. 143, 8 Am. Rep.
298; Smith v. Hays, (1886) 23 Ill. App. 244; Petersv. Johnson,-W. Va.-,
41 S.
.Rep. 190;] even where the person injured is a remote but naturally to
be expected user, (Thomas v. Winchester, sufira; Norton v. Sewall, sup5ra;
Wisev. Morgan, supira;) but the present case is easily distinguishable. It is
more nearly analogous to the case of the seller who furnishes, at the request of
the purchaser, a known, described and defined article, in which case, as is well
settled, (Mechem on Sales, 1349,) there is no implied-warranty of fitness for intended use. It seems clear enough that druggists, in these days, could do business on no other rule. Where the druggist is himself the manufacturer of the
article, and puts in harmful drugs, a different case is obviously presented.
See George v. Skivington, L. R. 5 Exch. 1.

PHYSICIAN-DUTY TO RESPOND TO CALL-An interesting case, apparently
of first impression, but determined upon well settled principles, came lately
before the supreme court of Indiana.
The defendant was a practicing
physician, licensed under the laws of the state, and holding himself out to
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the public as a general practitioner of medicine. He had been the family
physician of one Charlotte M. Burk. She became dangerously ill, and sent
for defendant. The messenger informed defendant of her dangerous illness,
tendered him his fee, and stated, what was the fact, that no other physician
was procurable.
Without any excuse whatever, as was alleged, defendant
refused to respond to the call, and death resulted. The action was by the
administrator of Charlotte M. Burk, to recover $10,000 for causing her
death. It was held that the action was not maintainable. The defendant,
it was said, was under no common law duty to respond to every call, and
the statute did not impose such a duty. "In obtaining the state's license
(permission) to practice medicine," said the court, "the state does not
require, and the licensee does not engage, that he will practice at all, or on
other terms than he may choose to accept. Analogies drawn from the
obligations to the public on the part 6f innkeepers, common carriers, and the
like, are beside the mark." Huerley v. Eddingflield (1901)-Ind.-59 N. 1.
Rep. 1058, 53 L. R. A. 135. The court was doubtless right both in regard to
the common law duty, and the effect of the statute, but it is also doubtless
true that the statute might impose such a duty, and perhaps should do so.

WITrLs-CONTRACT TO MAK-F--AUD IN OBTAINING CHARITY-RI.Ir
IN EqUITY.-An old woman without apparent means of support obtained aid

from an unincorporated charitable society, to the extent of several hundred dollars, upon representations of destitution. After furnishing her for several
years, the society suspected that she had property, and induced her to make
a will disposing of all her property to the society. The attorney for the society drew up the will and represented to her that he was informed that she had
agreed to make such a will in consideration of what the society had done,
were doing, and expected to do for her; to which she assented. Later she
revoked this will, and executed one disposing of all her property in favor of
relatives in Germany. She died leaving $3800, in savings bank deposits, all
of which except the accruing interest she had at the time the first aid was
obtained. The society filed a bill in equity, against theexecutor and legatees,
alleging these facts; and praying that the agreement and will be decreed an
irrevocable contract, " that the rights of your orators in any manner, in the
estate of Minna Stager be enforced against said defenddnts and said estate,"
and the defendants be required to account. The defendants answered denying.
the contract and all rights of the complainants.
The court of chancery found the contract alleged by the complainants, and
ordered all the property turned over to the complainants.
Anderson v.
Eggers, (N. J.) 47 Atl. Rep. 727. On appeal the court of errors held that the
alleged contract had not been made out, but that the allegation of fraud was,
sustained, and that the prayer of the bill and the jurisdiction of the court
warranted a decree in favor of the complainants for the value of the supplies
obtained by the fraudulent representations of the deceased. Opinion by
Dixon, J., Adams, J., dissenting. Anderson v. Eggers (New Jersey Court.
of Errors, June 17, 1901), 49 Atl. Rep. 578, 55 L.R.A. 570.
The following is from the opinion: "The claim that a legal obligation is
assumed must be supported by something beyond the consent to make a will-
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in the arrangement now beforeus, the wordsgo no farther than the making of
the will, and we must consider whether the substance fairly imports anything
more. * * * (Here the court reviews the facts.) At best it is not certain
that the parties meant what they did to amount to a legal obligation, * * *
and such uncertainty is sufficient to stay the hand of a court of equity.
"But there is another basis on which the bill may rest. The testimony fully
supports the allegation of the complainants that their contributions to Mrs.
Stager were induced by her fraudulent representations as to her means of living, and the prayer of the bill is sufficient to entitle the complainants to relief
on that ground if a court of equity is competent to afford relief. * * * That
the jurisdiction of the English court of chancery extended to such cases is
(Here the court reviews numerous English decisions.)
clear.
* * *
Undoubtedly, the American courts have not generally upheld so broad a jurisdiction, being influenced probably, and sometimes controlled, by enactments
similar to the United States judiciary act of 1789, which declares that 'suits
in equity shall not be sustained in either of the courts of the United States
in any case where a plain, adequate, and complete remedy may be had at
law.' But New Jersey is distinguished from her sister states by her adherence to the standards of the mother country respecting both rights and remedies in equity, and I know of no constitutional or statutory provision or judicial decision in this state which can be regarded as withholding or withdrawing from our court of chancery any jurisdiction possessed by its English prototypes. True, the jurisdiction of equity in cases of frakd remediable at law
has not been much invoked, but that may be accounted for in large degree by
the less expensive, equally efficient, and in former times more speedy, remedy
secured in the courts of law. When resorted to, however, the jurisdiction of
equity has not been doubted."

SAL-BANx CASHING DRAFT DRAWN AGAINST CONSIGN=ENT Ov GOODS AS
PURcHASnR-LrABI.ITY UPON EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTY OP TITLE OR
QuALITY.-The question whether a bank which cashes a draft, attached to a
bill of lading and drawn against the price of the goods named therein,
becomes liable, as though it were the seller, foirthe breach of the express or
implied warranties of quality or title with which the goods were originally
sold, was involved in the recent case of Hallv. Keller, (1902)-Kan.--67Pac.
Rep. 518. There the shipper of goods took the bill of lading to his own
order, endorsed it to the consignee intended, drew a draft on the consignee for
the price, and discounted the draft attached to the bill of lading at a local
bank. This bank sent the draft on for collection, and on its presentation to
the consignee, it was paid by him and the proceeds were remitted to the bank
which had discounted the draft. Before the goods reached their destination,
however, they were intercepted by a paramount title, and never came to
the hands of the consignee, although he had paid for them as above
indicated. The consignee brought this action against the bank, claiming that
the bank stood in the attitude of seller and was liable upon the implied warranty of title. Some authority for this position was found in two recent
cases involving that question,-Landa v. Lattin (1898), 19 Tex. Civ. App. 246,
46 S. W. Rep. 48; and Finch v. Gregg (1900), 126 N. C. 176, 35 S. B. Rep.
6
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251, 49 L. R. A. 679. (lMVicnrm ON SALUS, M1816.) These cases, however,
had previously been repudiated as unsound by the Iowa court in Tolerton &
Stetson Co. v. Anglo-CaliforniaBank (1901), 112 Iowa, 706, 84 N. W. Rep.
930, 50 L. R. A. 777, and the Kansas court concurred with the Iowa court.
The same rule was applied to Keller & Dean, a firm of attorneys, who had
endorsed the draft before the bank discounted it. The court said that to hold
the bank liable under such circumstances as these would discourage the
immense business constantly carried on in this way and would "undoubtedly
cause a revolution in commercial circles."

VOTIRS-RIGHET TO VOT4 IOR CANDIDATB NVHOSE NAmE IS NoT ON TH
OrrcIAl, BAT.1,oT.-Whether a voter has an absolute right to vote for whom
he pleases, or whether under the Australian ballot law his right can lawfully
be limited to voting for some person only whose name is on the ticket, is a
question which is growing in interest and difficulty. In the very recent case
of Chamberlin v. Wood (1901)-S. Dak.-, 88 N. W. Rep. 109, is it held by
a majority of the court that the legislature, in enacting an election law, may
lawfully provide that no vote shall be counted which is not made by checking
a name already printed on the official ballot, and that such a limitation
involves no unlawful restriction upon the voter's constitutional rights. The
argument of the majority is, in brief, that the right to vote is not a natural
one, but a right conferred by the law, and that, unless restrained by express
constitutional prohibition, the legislature may impose such regulations as it
deems necessary to promote the public interests. Under the statute in question, a candidate's name could appear on the official ballot only when he had
been nominated by a regular party organization or when twenty voters had
requested it. The court conceded that there were declarations to the contrary
in Sanner v. Patton, 155 Ill. 553, 40 N. .Rep. 290; Peoplev. Shaw. 133 N. Y.
493, 31 N,.E. Rep. 512, 16 L. R. A. 606; Bowers v. Smith, 17 S. W. Rep.
761, 20 S. W. Rep. 101, 111 Mo. 45, 33 Am. St. Rep. 491; and State v. Dillon'
32 Pla. 545, 14 So. Rep. 383, 22 L. R. A. 124, but contended that in all of
these cases, except the last, the expressions relied upon were mere dicta, while
in the last case the point, though passed upon, was unnecessary to the decision
of the case. Fuller, P. J., dissented.

CONSTITuTIONAl, IAW-FOUPTENTH A
ND=MNT-Dun PRoczss-guAr.
PROTZCTION.-The statutes of Ohio forbade the manufacture or sale within

that state of any artificial butter made "in imitation or semblance of natural
butter." Natural butter might be made with or without any harmless coloring matter, but artificial butter was required to be free from any coloring
matter causing it to look or appear like natural butter, and, by a later act,
the use of certain enumerated coloring matters, which might lawfully be used
in natural butter, was forbidden in the case of artificial butter. As against a
domestic corporation, engaged in making and selling artificial butter in violation of the terms of the statutes referred to, Held, that the statutes were not
in conflict with the constitution of the United States. CaitUal City Dairy
Co. v. Ohio (1901), 183 U. S. 238.
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It was urged that the legislation was in conflict with the power of Congress
to regulate inter-state commerce, but as the corporation was a domestic one,
operating within the State, it was held that the statutes affected the product
before it had become a subject of inter-state commerce. It was also urged
that inasmuch as the use of harmless coloring matter was permitted in the
case of natural butter, but denied in the case of artificial butter, there was a
denial of the equal protection of the laws, and a taking of property without
due process of law. But it was held that as the state court had decided that
this was not for the purpose of discriminating in favor of butter, but only to
provide a means by which the public might distinguish between natural and
artificial butter, the legislation must be deemed valid. " It cannot in reason
be said," declared the supreme court, "as a mere matter of judicial inference, that such regulations for such purpose were a mere arbitrary interference with rights of property, denying the equal protection of the laws, or that
they amounted to a taking of property without due process of law." Powell
v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, and Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461,
were held to be conclusive of the questions presented.

STATUTE O LIMITATIONS-FAILURB TO 14]Av SUB3ACNT SUPPORT IN
Mn NG-W.mw STATUTE BEGINs To RUN.-The supreme court of Pennsylvania hadoccasion, in a late case, to pass upon the vexed question as to the
time when the statute of limitations begins to run, where there has been a
failure to leave sufficient supports to maintain the surface-whether from the
time the mineral is removed, or from the time when the surface subsides.
The court held that the statute begins to run from the former date, so that in
the case at bar there couldbe no recovery where there had been no subsidence
until after the statutory period had expired, Noonan v. Pardee,200 Pa. 474,
The court cited several English
50 AtI. Rep. 255 (1901), 55 I,.R.A. 410.
cases, including Backhouse v. Bonoin, 9 H. L. Cas. 503, but declared that the
cases in England were so conflicting that the law could not be considered as
settled there. Curiously enough, however, it failed to cite (though the
briefs show it had its attention drawn to) the leading and important case of
Darley Main Colliery Co. v. Mitchell, 11 App. Cas. 127, (Mechem's Cases on
Damages, 117,) wherein the House of Lords fully considered the question
and came to the opposite conclusion.

